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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REGULATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 





This paper will describe and evaluate the main regulatory changes that have been carried out 
in response to the financial crisis via Basel 3, the US Dodd Frank Bill and other initiatives, 
with the goal of drawing policy implications for emerging market and middle income 
developing country financial regulators and policy-makers.  
 
Prior to the financial crisis, the global financial system failed to fulfill its two main purposes: 
managing risk and efficiently allocating capital. Many emerging market banks did not have 
significant exposure to “toxic assets”, and were better able to withstand the financial market 
crisis than banks in industrialized countries. Some countries, such as Brazil, imposed 
restrictions on derivatives and naked short selling prior to the crisis, and instituted reserve 
requirements well in excess of Basel 2 minimums. (See UN, 2010.)  Nonetheless, as markets 
continue to develop, financial institutions in middle income countries are becoming more 
exposed to the types of risks that hobbled the global financial system. Furthermore, in many 
middle income countries much of the assets of the financial system have traditionally gone 
into government paper rather than lending to the real economy, whereas access to credit to 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) is necessary for sustained economic growth and 
development. The challenge for emerging market and middle income policymakers is to 
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encourage lending to the real economy, while protecting the stability of the financial system in 
an increasingly globalized economy.   
 
Policymakers need to increase the resilience of their banking system to domestic and external 
shocks, improve the functionality of the financial system as a means of intermediating credit 
to the private sector, especially SMEs, and prevent abusive lending practices (such as those in 
the subprime market in the US) as markets develop. In this paper, we highlight aspects of the 
recent regulatory changes that we consider to have priority for middle income countries, such 
as counter-cyclical regulations, strong capital requirements focused on the quality of capital, 
regulations of derivatives, and evaluation of banks’ business models by regulators, as well as 
measures to increase credit to the real economy.  We start with a discussion of lessons from a 
new business model used by many financial institutions in industrialized countries prior to the 
crisis, and then analyze lessons from Basel 3, the Dodd-Frank Act, the Consumer Protection 
Agency, and EU-initiatives. 
 
Properly regulating domestic finance also requires complementary capital account regulation. 
Given that the paper is already ambitious in its coverage, we will, however, not explore this 
issue (but see for an excellent early survey of options, Stiglitz, Ocampo, and Spiegel, 2006). 
Similarly, we do not explore in detail the implications that the ongoing developed countries’ 
sovereign debt crisis may have on future regulations, though these may be quite significant. 
 
 
New business models of banks spreading financial instability- Evidence from the crisis 
 
One critical element in the development of the financial crisis has been the new “originate-to-
distribute” (OTD) business model of banking. OTD is based on intermediation of credit-risk 
rather than on the traditional bank model of holding credits on the banks’ own balance sheets. 
In this model banks loans are warehoused on the bank’s balance sheets, securitized, and then 
sold to investors. The theoretical justification for such securitization is that by combining 
assets into a pool, investors are better able to diversify risk, thus increasing the efficiency of 
capital markets and attracting new financing. In fact, securitization did draw substantial 
amounts of new funds into the US housing market. The problem was that the inflows 
eventually turned into a bubble, leading to the collapse of the entire global financial system 
when it burst.  
 
Over time, the asset backed securities used in the OTD became increasingly complex, so 
much so that it was often difficult for investors – and rating agencies – to value the risk in 
many of the securities. Further, many of the securities had embedded leverage that increased 
systemic risk. For example, banks often guaranteed the securities to sweeten their appeal to 
investors, so that the banks were obligated to repossess the underlying assets in the event of 
defaults or credit downgrades, as was the case during the crisis. Banks thus used off-balance 
sheet vehicles and guarantees to amass a larger implicit exposure to mortgage assets than they 
had officially recorded, causing large damage to the balance sheet of these institutions 
(Citibank being the prime example).  
 
One of the byproducts of the OTD model has been an increased reliance on short-term 
funding through the wholesale banking market to finance their warehoused loans and off-
balance sheet obligations. Although banks have always tended to have maturity mismatches, 
in traditional banking, short-term liabilities are mostly in the form of bank deposits, which are 
considerably less volatile than the wholesale market (due to deposit insurance and other forms 
of protections).   
 
The case of the British bank, Northern Rock, provides a good example of how the OTDmodel 
based on short term financing can threaten financial stability. The most famous bank run in 
the crisis, the case of Northern Rock might have appeared to be a typical bank run, with 
people forming queues in front of the bank to withdraw their money. But as Hyun Song Shin 
convincingly argues (2010), the real bank run had occurred days before in the wholesale 
banking market. Northern Rock’s business model was to lend to the UK housing market and 
fund its loans through the international interbank market. It then securitzed the mortgage 
loans and sold them to international investors. However, it became impossible for Northern 
Rock to sell its warehoused securitized loans during the crisis; it was also unable to refinance 
the loans through the interbank market. When liquidity in this market dried up, Northern Rock 
faced insurmountable problems, which contributed to a market panic, exacerbating the crisis. 
 
Policy Implications  
The OTD model has several implications for policymakers. First, regulators need to rethink 
how banks account for risks. Regulators could, for example, require that all transactions are 





                                                
well as regulators) and avoid regulatory arbitrage (see D’Arista and Griffith-Jones, 2010). The 
issuance of covered bonds by banks, for example, allows banks to refinance in capital 
markets, while they retain all assets on their balance sheet. This form of refinancing has 
proven to be very resilient during the crisis.  However, in practice, it might still be difficult for 
regulators to evaluate the risks of many of today’s financial market products given their 
complexity, especially without complex risk systems. Additional measures are needed. 
 
Second, there is a moral hazard problem implicit in the OTD-model. The fact that loans are 
issued to be securitized means that neither the bank nor the investor is focused on the credit 
quality of individual borrowers.2 This distance between the ultimate creditors and borrowers 
has led to deteriorating credit monitoring and underwriting standards. In addition, 
securitization appears to have impeded the renegotiation of distressed loans. A study by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (Agarwal,et. al., 2011) on US mortgages found that bank-
held loans were 26 - 36% more likely to be renegotiated than securitized loans, and that 
modifications of bank-held loans was more efficient, with lower post-modification default 
rates. 
 
A question that middle income countries may want to ask themselves is the extent to which 
they want to allow securitization of assets as a mechanism for financing. Nonetheless, some 
middle income countries, such as Brazil, have begun to build domestic securitization markets. 
To reduce increasing systemic risk to the financial system through this market, it is important 
that it be regulated with the goal of addressing the moral hazard issues discussed above. One 
such tool is to mandate that banks retain a portion of the loan portfolio on their books. For 
example, US regulators have tried to increase the “skin in the game” for banks that originate 
loans for securitization by imposing a 5% retention of the loan portfolio on these banks. Many 
analysts and economists believe that this level is too low to change incentives given the high 
profitability banks enjoy in the securitization-business. However, with a more realistic 
ownership percentage, the type of restriction could be a useful tool in countries with 
burgeoning securitization markets. 
 
Limited securitization via governmental platforms that guarantee high quality standards (such 
 
2 Lenders are concerned with whether particular loans are appropriate to be bundled into a diversified portfolio 
for securitization. The buyers of the securities are often not equipped to analyze thousands of underlying loans. 
These investors are more concerned with the overall credit quality of the pool, including the extent of 
diversification and credit enhancements.  
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as the German True Sale Platform) can also be an option. In conjunction with these platforms, 
one requirement can be for the lenders to retain a high proportion of the loans made.  
 
Overall, the OTD model, with its emphasis on securitization, led to increased leverage, 
maturity mismatches, and increased systemic risk. More broadly, the recent crisis unveiled 
that core capital charges were too low, simple leverage was too high and that the entire 
banking system was embedded in a pro-cyclical accounting and regulatory framework. The 
regulatory initiatives have sought to find answers to these different problems with mixed 
success. The measures they propose will be critically evaluated in the following.  
 
Basel 3, the Dodd-Frank Act, the Consumer Protection Agency, and EU-initiatives 
International Regulators acted with relative speed and were able to introduce major legislation 
within two years of the Lehman bankruptcy. However, many elements of these regulations are 
not implemented or finalized. Basel 3, which took only two years to be designed is the most 
wide-reaching agreement and will be presented first.  
 
Basel 3 
Basel 3 tries to cure several of the shortcomings revealed by the crisis. It aims at higher 
quality core capital, it limits off-balance sheet activities of banks via special purpose entities, 
and it seeks to institute new measures to prevent systemic short-term illiquidity (s. Griffith-
Jones, Silver and Thiemann 2011, Meaulle 2011).  
 
Dealing with the first level of systemic risk, it approximately doubles core capital, while also 
time demanding higher quality core capital. In addition, a simple leverage measure of 1 to 30 
is introduced.   
“The minimum requirement for common equity, considered as the highest form of loss 
absorbing capital, will be raised from 2% to 4.5% after the application of stricter 
adjustments. The Tier 1 capital requirement, which includes common equity and other 
qualifying financial instruments, will increase from 4% to 6% over the same period, 
while the minimum total capital ratio remains unchanged at 8%. The amount of 
intangible and qualified assets that can be included in capital will be limited to 15%. 
This increase in the level of capital comes on top of an increase in the capital 
requirements for trading book exposures, counterparty credit risk, and exposures to 
other financial institutions” (Meaulle 2011: 14).  
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These changes are not only relevant quantitatively, but also qualitatively; by deducting 
goodwill and other intangible assets from core capital, and forcing the banks to hold 85% of 
core capital as common equity (equity and retained earnings, s. ibid). The improved quality of 
core capital is particularly important in that the capital will be immediately available to banks 
in the event of a crisis. While core capital is high in middle income countries, the question of 
the quality of this core capital needs to be posed.  
 
These changes will increase the capacity of banks to better withstand future shocks. Several 
authors have argued, however, that the established changes are too small to increase resilience 
of the system enough. Instead they suggest that core capital should be 25% of risk weighted 
assets (s. Admati et al 2010). Another recent study by the Bank of England (Miles et al 2011), 
using 200 years of data on a wide range of countries, identifies 50% of risk weighted assets as 
an appropriate level of capital adequacy given the historical frequency and severity of crises 
in these countries. This is significantly more than currently envisaged by Basel 3. 
 
These arguments stem from a perspective of social costs and benefits on the broader economy. 
As recent historical work has shown (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) banking crises impose 
severe and long lasting costs, including years of anemic growth and high unemployment, 
which by far outweigh the private gains made by bankers and rentiers before the financial 
crisis. In addition to these historically grounded arguments, arguments from economic theory 
further strengthen this perspective. According to the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, the cost of 
borrowing should fall with an increase in equity, making overall costs for the banks more 
manageable. Miles et al (2011) estimate from their data that an increase in equity leads to a 
substantial reduction in the risk premium to be paid on equity. However, it is important not to 
equate the profitability of the sector with the social benefits it provides to society. Indeed, as 
we have seen in the crisis high profitability can be a sign of high future social costs. 
Furthermore a decrease in the probability of crises to the overall system and the related social 
benefits far outweigh the reduction in profitability of banks.  
 
Opponents have argued that forcing individual banks to increase capital would stigmatize the 
banks. This is why this measure needs to be applied to all banks at the same time. Opponents 
of this measure also argue that a credit crunch to the real economy might occur as banking 
inter-mediation might become too costly (e.g. recent remarks by Greenspan, as well as studies 
by the International Institute of Finance, which represents the position of large private banks). 
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However, Miles and his coauthors estimate that the costs of inter-mediation, when doubling 
the equity from its current levels in the UK, would only go up by 18 bps. While this rise in 
costs to credit is substantial, governments can use the increased tax income from bank equity 
to subsidize those debtors which from a social perspective are especially creditworthy. 
Furthermore, the whole point of the measure is to reduce leverage in the banking system, 
especially during boom periods. Thus countercyclical capital requirements, as discussed 
below, might be an effective tool. 
 
An increase in the capital levels by a factor of at least two thus may be appropriate. A major 
means for achieving this goal is to require banks to retain earnings, and restrict bonuses or 
other high payments to their employees, for a sufficient amount of time, thereby slowly 
increasing the equity of banks.  
 
The measures discussed above address micro-prudential concerns, but do not yet address the 
macro-prudential dimension. Furthermore, the big question remains as to the appropriate risk 
weighting of assets. Many of the institutions that were bailed out during the crisis looked well 
capitalized (s. Admati et al 2010: 59). This, however, is no protection if markets “start 
recognizing lifetime losses of risky assets all at once” (S&P 2011), leading to a loss of 
confidence and a drying up of funding liquidity. Therefore, besides increasing the core capital 
to risk weighted assets, the leverage ratio of banks needs to be reduced. As critics have 
pointed out, a leverage ratio of 1 to 30, as currently envisioned in Basel 3 requirements, would 
not have posed any problems to most of crisis-stricken banks before the crisis, as for example 
US investment banks, that later run into major problems, had that kind of leverage (s. Hellwig 
2010). The consequence is a remaining greater vulnerability to a loss of confidence, or as 
Hellwig puts it: “If equity amounts to 2.5 % of the balance sheet, it also doesn’t take long for 
concerns about solvency to arise.” Canadian banks, which had significantly lower leverage 
ratios than US ones, did not run into problems. A lower leverage ratio than required by Basel 
3 thus seems appropriate, especially when considering the systemic dimension of leverage. 
This is also particularly relevant for middle income countries. A highly leveraged banking 
system will be more vulnerable to shocks and could be forced to shrink its balance sheets 
significantly in times of crisis as a result of even relatively small losses.  
 
A macro-prudential tool introduced by Basel 3 is a counter-cyclical buffer, within a range of 0% – 
2.5% of common equity up and above general core capital requirements. The focus is on 
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excessive aggregate credit growth on a national level. The advantage of counter-cyclical loss 
provisioning is that it adjusts the expected loss from credit to the average of a business cycle, 
thereby fighting excessively optimistic predictions and building up buffers beyond core 
capital charges as protection against unexpected losses. Banks that do not meet the buffer will 
be subject to restrictions on capital distributions (dividends, share repurchases, and 
discretionary bonus payments to staff) until they do. Basel 3 advises the use of the credit to 
GDP gap as the leading indicator for the calculation of the counter-cyclical capital buffer.3  
Repullo and Saurina point out (2011:7f), this measure lacks any relationship to business cycle 
indicators, and is thus not inherently anti-cyclical. The authors suggest that it even acts pro-
cyclically in several industrialized countries (ibid: 13). Therefore national banking regulators 
need to assess the relationship of the business cycle indicators with the credit to GDP ratios, 
as well as consider the use of other indicators that relate credit growth to the business cycle 
(Repullo and Saurinas suggest the deviation of credit growth from the trend) and other 
measures, such as loan-loss provisiong.  
 
Instead of extrapolating the recent past into the future, loan loss provisioning estimates 
average credit losses to banks’ loan portfolios through the business cycle. They thereby force 
banks to withstand the temptation of “this time is different”-thinking in boom periods. In 
order to avoid regulatory capture (which can include intellectual capture, especially during 
boom periods), clear ex-ante rules, that cannot be changed, on the scale of a counter-cyclical 
buffer need to be defined. An important additional rule should be that counter-cyclical buffers 
should never be diminished in boom times; however, they could be increased, for example if 
credit growth is accelerating and/or there is a great deal of financial innovation (see again 
Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, op cit). A bi-annual statement that is explaining the view of the 
regulator on desirable credit growth might be a good additional institutional tool for achieving 
transparency.  
 
Loan-loss provisioning has proven its worth during the crisis in the case of Spain and is also 
already used to a certain extent in some Latin American countries. As the current economic 
crisis unfolds in Spain, partially caused by an excessive mortgage growth, it seems that the 
charge for Spanish banks may have been too limited. Though Spanish statistical (counter-
cyclical) provisions have helped strengthen the large Spanish banks; particularly problematic 
 
3Meaning the deviation of the current credit to GDP ratio from its trend. If the current credit to GDP ratio is the 
average plus a fixed percentage, additional capital provisioning starts.   
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in Spain was that specific limits or regulations were not imposed on very rapid expansion of 
lending for mortgages. This however, does not disprove the idea of counter-cyclical loan loss 
provisioning, but on the contrary means that regulators should react more strongly to sectorial 
credit growth which moves sharply out of line. (s. Geneva report 2009, Griffith-Jones and 
Ocampo op cit: 9).  One way to deal with these issues is to introduce “limits on loan-to-
collateral value ratios and rules to adjust the values of collateral to reflect long-term market 
trends in asset values rather than cyclical variations.” (ibid: 4) In this way a self-feeding credit 
frenzy, fed by rising asset values can be partially contained. Financial regulators might also 
institute limits to credit growth in certain categories. It is also important to include off-balance 
sheet items in provisioning. 
 
The newest, but at the same time least certain innovations in Basel 3 regard the regulation of 
liquidity. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the net stable funding ratio are direct responses to 
the problems of funding liquidity experienced during the crisis. Banks have to prove that they 
can fund themselves for one month (liquidity coverage ratio) and for one year. 
“The liquidity coverage ratio identifies the amount of unencumbered, high quality liquid 
assets an institution holds that can be used to offset the net cash outflows it would encounter 
under an acute short-term stress scenario specified by supervisors… The net stable funding 
(NSF) ratio measures the amount of longer-term, stable sources of funding employed by an 
institution relative to the liquidity profiles of the assets funded and the potential for contingent 
calls on funding liquidity arising from off-balance sheet commitments and obligations. The 
standard requires a minimum amount of funding that is expected to be stable over a one year 
time horizon based on liquidity risk factors assigned to assets and off-balance sheet liquidity 
exposures. The NSF ratio is intended to promote longer-term structural funding”. (BCBS 2010: 
3). 
 
The liquidity coverage ratio is intended to make sure that no re-occurrence of the failure of banks 
is possible due to liquidity guarantees of banks granted to the shadow banking sector or other 
reasons. It aims at preventing banks from taking on liquidity risks they cannot shoulder, whereas 
the net stable funding ratio is aiming to decrease the likelihood of another bank run in the 
wholesale financial markets. One of their important innovation is to include off-balance sheet 
obligations of the banks. However, the extent to which these measures will increase the resilience 
of the financial system cannot yet be gauged, because they will only come into force in 2018 and 
in the meantime will be tested via impact studies and if necessary adjusted to not disturb the 
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markets too much. Thus, one might fear a potential softening of these rules during the phase 
of implementation.  
 
In the meantime, one can say that the liquidity coverage ratio has successfully been applied in 
the Netherlands, where it originated in 2003, by averting the failure of Dutch banks in the 
financial crisis, even though these banks had major off-balance sheet obligations.  This 
regulation on liquidity becomes especially urgent if there are trends in their banking sector 
towards wholesale financing in the financial markets (which is often short-term) and/or the 
take-up of off-balance sheet obligations, such as the granting of liquidity lines to 
securitization vehicles.  
 
Regulators in middle income countries should seek to emulate regulations on liquidity, 
adapting them to their individual circumstances. More generally, the degree of mismatch of 
maturities seems an important indicator for the extent (both in terms of severity and speed) to 
which liquidity requirements should be implemented in middle income countries. Regulators 
want to make sure that if these two markets (wholesale and off-balance sheet) fall into distress 
it will not cause an immediate threat of banks failures. One can therefore say that those 
elements of regulation in the Basel Accord which most directly attack the weaknesses in the 
business models of banks revealed by the crisis are the least certain and the longest away in 
time. Therefore, banking regulators should seek to counter the threat of illiquidity by ensuring 
a more appropriate mix of funding which is more long-term oriented. (See also Warwick 
Commission Report, 2010, for an in-depth analysis of this issue.) If it is technically 
impossible to monitor the maturity mismatches of banks and thus their liquidity needs on a 
more fine grained level, banking regulators can, for example, increase the reserves banks need 
to hold at the central bank up and above what several developing countries already require (s. 
Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2009: 15, Ocampo and Chiappe 2003: 93f).  
 
There are many other measures that are currently proposed in the academic realm in order to 
capture better systemic risk, such as the idea of including systemic risk measures of banks 
into core capital requirements for banks, such as the CoVar (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2011). 
The idea is that banks should not only hold equity according to the riskiness of their assets but 
also according to the risks their failure poses to the entire financial system. In this vein, the 
Basel committee has recently identified 28 banks qualifying as global systemic banks, which 
will face additional capital requirements ranging from 1% to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets to 
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be met exclusively with common equity, the highest quality capital, the Basel committee said. 




For regulators in middle income countries, several lessons can be drawn from these measures. 
Basel 3 should make the banking system safer in the long run, however, in the short run (up 
until 2018)  the changes will not yet be fully phased in, which means that the international 
financial system will remain unstable in the near future. Furthermore, the fact that the 
sovereign debt problems of Europe and the US, as well as their implications for those regions 
financial stability, are unresolved at the time of writing may pose new challenges to middle 
income countries and the stability of their banking systems. Therefore, regulators in middle 
income countries should:  
a. Seek to be actively involved in the creation of mechanisms to deal with the failure of 
large banking conglomerates engaged in cross-border banking in your country (the 
failure of Fortis, the Dutch-Belgian bank in 2008 is an example of what can go wrong 
in such a bankruptcy) 
b. Pro-actively investigate the changing business models of their banks in their own 
countries (very much including branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks), and their 
exposure to systemic failures of critical elements such as the inter-banking market. If 
banks take up too much risk, which is not yet properly regulated, it is important to 
regulate these banks from risks emanating from  these markets in order to avoid large 
losses (s. Thiemann 2011 for such an analysis for the European banking market). As 
the UN Stiglitz Commission argued, for national regulators to carry out these and 
other regulations more effectively, it is desirable that foreign banks’ presence in 
middle income countries is done via subsidiaries rather than branches. 
c. Several of the ideas underlying Basel 3, such as counter-cyclical buffers, liquidity 
ratios, increase in quantity and (especially) quality of core capital, should be integrated 
into national regulatory frameworks, adapted to local circumstances. There may be a 
case for middle income countries to accelerate implementation of Basel 3 suggestions 
to a schedule which is quicker than the slow one of Basel itself, in areas where this is 
particularly relevant to their financial systems (such as for example counter-cyclical 
regulation). 
d. Install ex-ante mechanisms to facilitate emergency measures such as the granting of 
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trade credit lines for the case that trade credit dries up again. 
e. Focus on measures to that encourage the banking sector to lend to the real economy, 
especially SMEs, while preserving financial sector stability, as discussed below. 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
The other major financial initiative in recent years has been the Dodd-Frank Act in the United 
States, which in its final shape has been more rigorous than initially feared by those 
concerned with financial stability, but still too weak in some respects (s. Griffith-Jones et al 
2010). It aimed at prohibiting proprietary trading of banks (Volcker-rule), the implementation 
of resolution capacity in order to deal with the failure of large systemically important banks 
(living wills) and increasing transparency in the derivatives market by forcing most of the 
trades into central clearing houses. However, significant exceptions were introduced into the 
Dodd-Frank Act in these and other crucial aspects (eg Volcker rule and forcing all derivatives 
on the exchanges). Equally or more important,  implementation is proving to be very slow and 
difficult, due to the large amount of implementation studies which are not yet finished, the 
lack of funding for the regulatory agencies, the increasing political backlash to regulation in a 
faltering economy, and political changes in the US. In the following matrix we will shortly 
contrast these measures as they were decided with their state of enactment. 
 
The Dodd Frank bill was signed into law on July 21st 2010 by President Obama. One year 
after its passage, in total, 80% of regulatory deadlines have been missed. This means that 
most of the work is far from completed and it is very difficult to assess in how far it will make 
Wall Street more resilient. In the following we use a chart we have compiled a year ago (s. 











Needed in order 
to reduce 
interconnectedn
ess of banks and 
the probability 
of default, banks 





deposits of their 
“In recent years, 
too many 
financial firms 
have put taxpayer 
money at risk by 
operating hedge 
funds and private 
equity funds … 
When banks 
benefit from the 
safety net that 
taxpayers provide 
Rule has been adopted. 
However, the bill will 
allow banks to hold on 
to hedge fund and 
private equity funds 
equal to 3% of their tier 
1 capital. Furthermore, 
there are problems for 
regulators to 
distinguish between 
proprietary trading and 
trading for clients, 
Volcker Rule becomes 
effective on July 21st 2014, 
with discretionary 
possibility for the regulator 
to extend it for three more 
years (2017). Investments 
in Illiquid funds can be 
extended for an additional 
5 years (2022). Recent 
study of financial stability 
oversight board fails to 
make a clear distinction 
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clients … it is not 
appropriate for 
them to turn 
around and use 
that cheap money 
to trade for profit 
(Obama, January 
21st 2010) 
which almost certainly 
will allow loop holes.  
between market making 
and proprietary trading, 
thus unresolved. First 
hedge funds and 
proprietary trading desks 
have left some banks.  
Transparency 






Needed in order 
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systemic 
stability, as e.g. 
sellers of 
insurance (such 
as AIG) will 
have to hold 
capital in order 
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time reporting of 
derivatives trades 
to regulators and 
the public and 
laws which will 




in a letter to 
Senator Cantwell 
et al.)  
Transparency and 
margin requirements 
will be instituted for all 
derivatives which can 
be cleared through 
clearing houses. For 
those, for which no 
clearing houses can be 
established and those 
involving end-users 
will be exempted. The 
regulatory details of 
who and what will fall 
under these categories 
will be worked out.  
The dispute between what 
can and cannot be 
regulated via Clearing 
Houses is not yet resolved. 
Big question mark over 
how far the rules will be 
enforceable in regulations 
other than the US. Fear of 
a race to the bottom with 
respect to Hong Kong and 












ess of banks and 
thereby reduce 
systemic risk.  
“In my view, 




have been the 
single largest 
factor to these 
institutions 
growing so large 
that taxpayers had 
no choice but to 
bail them out in 
order to prevent 
total economic 
ruin.” (Senator 




Banks will be allowed 
to keep most of their 
derivatives desks (such 
as in foreign 
exchange). Banks will 
have to push out to 




swaps which are not 
cleared through an 
exchange 
Applicable from June 
2012, with a 2 year period 
of discretion for the 
regulator. Problematic is 
the large number of 
exemptions, as banks will 
be allowed to maintain 
interest rate swaps, foreign 
exchange swaps, bullion 
swaps and others.  
Capital Ratios Capital 
adequacy ratios 
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Some forms of hybrid 
capital are deemed too 
risky to be used for 
capital provisioning. 
Bank Holding 
Companies will have to 
consolidate their 
capital ratios for their 
structure as a whole. 
Some of the transitions 
periods are shorter than for 
Basel 3, so that US banks 
might face tougher 
regulation faster. Given 
that the US wants to adopt 
Basel 3, there might be 
some form of alignment of 
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The problem of 
too big to fail 
Banks should be 
reduced in size 
in order to stop 
cheaper 
borrowing for 
banks which are 
deemed too big 
to fail and thus 
to avoid the 
high fiscal costs 
of rescuing huge 
banks which are 
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Wall Street regulation 
does not break-up big 
banks nor does it 
impose a penalty on 
being too big to fail. 
“Orderly liquidation” is 
supposed to solve this 
problem. Further 
regulation might be 
imposed by regulators 
after impact studies. 
Mergers which would 
lead to banks holding 
more than 10% of 
financial assets are 
prohibited.   
Living Wills and the 
Orderly Liquidation 
Authority are about to be 
instituted and banks start 
to draw up living wills 
determining what to do in 
case of bankruptcy. 
However, banks are not 
paying into the orderly 
liquidation fund to finance 
the costs of future 
bankruptcies; (S. Wilmarth 
2011). The complexity of 
wind downs and the 
danger of loss of 
confidence have led S&P 
to doubt that in the future, 
TBTF banks would not 
receive support.4   
 
All in all, the current phase of implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act is rather disappointing. 
While the Dodd-Frank Act does reduce some of the risk taking of large banks, the “too big to 
fail” issue seems not to be resolved, which increases the likelihood of these banks growing 
further and having devastating effect if one of them fails. Banking regulators in middle 
income countries should thus assume that the probability of future financial crises has not 
been substantially reduced given the fast pace of product innovation, as well as the unresolved 
nature of sovereign debt problems and the risk they pose to the financial system’s stability (s. 
also S&P 2011 on this point).  
                                                 
4  “We believe that under certain circumstances and with selected systemically important financial institutions, 




On the question of derivatives regulation, while there is undeniably a move towards pushing 
more derivatives through clearing houses, two decisive questions remain. To what extent will 
this regulation be enforceable or accepted globally? And which derivatives will be excluded 
from the clearing houses? As long as these two questions are not decided, it is impossible to 
determine the impact it will have on the risks derivatives pose to the financial system. In this 
respect it seems useful to point out again that clearing derivatives through central clearing 
houses increases the knowledge of the regulator over the positions in the market. In addition, 
it transfers the problem of too interconnected to fail towards these clearing houses, which then 
need to be protected from failure. Derivatives regulations are needed for the financial 
regulator to assess risks posed by banks and to mitigate them if there is a banking failure. 
Furthermore, clearinghouses provide transparency to the market itself, which makes risk 
management easier. 
 
The depth of the sovereign  debt crisis, and the role played in it by derivatives, such as credit  
default swaps, as well as short selling, raises new regulatory challenges, yet unmet, which 
may have priority in future months. It is interesting that countries like Brazil had previous 
experience of short selling (including naked short selling) of government debt by financial 
institutions, which deepened their sovereign debt problems in the past (see Dodd and Griffith-
Jones 2007). It is unfortunate that the developed countries were not more sympathetic to such 
problems in middle income countries; curbing such practices then would not only have helped 
middle income countries then, but could have restricted excessive pressures on developed 
countries’ government debt or stock markets today. The banning of short selling of stocks by 
several European regulators again in August 2011 is an interesting development. 
 
A very useful way of pushing derivatives contracts into clearing houses, potentially of interest 
also to regulators from middle income countries has been suggested by Lynn Stout. She 
analyzes the regulation of derivatives in the US before 1999, which made the distinction 
between bets on future price developments and hedges. If derivatives were identified as bets, 
they were not enforceable according to US law. This required the necessity for speculators to 
use central clearing houses, in which the parties to a deal agree to honor the deal under private 
law, even if unenforceable under public law (s. Stout 2011). In this way, speculators were 
forced into the central clearing house, a pressure which vanished once all wagers on the future 
became enforceable in US law. Such a regulation could be considered in middle income 
16 
 
countries. Of course it does not resolve the issue of cross-country competition for lax 
regulation on derivatives. In this respect, the forging of a global agreement on derivatives 
regulation seems in order, for which the support of middle income countries will also be 
needed.  
 
Positive Institutional Innovations of the Dodd-Frank Act: The Consumer Protection 
Agency and the Systemic Risk Regulator 
While much of the final implementation of the rules of the Dodd-Frank bill are still negotiated 
as we write, the Dodd-Frank Bill led to some institutional innovations, two of which we 
consider especially important for middle income countries. The first large scale measure 
enacted in the US is the creation of a consumer protection bureau. The agency seeks to 
counter abusive lending practices and protect consumers, which in part explains the massive 
resistance of the banking sector against it and its powers. Although the extent of its mandate it 
is still being debated in the US, a powerful regulator in the realm of consumer protection 
could be a useful mechanism for middle income countries on their way of increasing access to 
credit to their populations in a financially sustainable way. Consumer credit is growing 
rapidly there and this agency can serve to protect consumers from usurious lending practices 
(for such cases in Brazil and Chile, s. NY Times 23rd of July 2011).  
 
Another interesting and positive institutional regulatory development in the US (and also in 
Europe), is the creation of a Systemic Risk regulator, which brings together different 
regulators in order to avoid silo-thinking and to connect different trends in different markets. 
Given that banking has become so interwoven with other parts of the financial system, such as 
the money market funds, developing instabilities in one part of the financial system can easily 
impact another. Again this may be a development that should be considered in middle income 
countries.  
 
The response of the European Union 
The EU has been seen as a laggard with regard to financial regulation compared to the US, a 
statement which loses some of its veracity given the recent stalemate in implementing the 
Dodd-Frank Act. The European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) is currently debated 
in the European parliament and the European Commission, in which the goal of pushing 




The Capital Adequacy Directives 1 to 3 have already become European law, making the 
biggest part of Basel 3 a reality from 2013 onwards, the last parts are currently being debated 
in the Capital Adequacy Directives 4. The three new European regulators (European Banking 
Authority, the European Securities Regulator and the European Insurance Regulator) will seek 
to enforce Basel 3 on a common ground, trying to make regulatory definitions of capital etc. 
unequivocal. This is an important development as thereby national discretion of regulators to 
support their banking system can be prevented. As such, these developments might be also a 
good example for a common framework of regulation in the Latin American and Asian 
jurisdictions.  
 
Conclusions: How do these changes matter for middle income countries? 
Middle income countries have been faced with strong capital inflows, at low cost. An 
important proportion of these funds, however, is driven by short term factors, which can be 
reversed (s. East Asian crisis, as well as Latin American crises). At the same time, 
consumption fueled credit growth seems to have taken hold in several middle income 
countries. Strong counter-cyclical measures by regulators in middle income countries seem 
appropriate, which could be coupled with stronger consumer protection regulation, which 
would protect burgeoning middle classes, as well as help build confidence in developing 
capital markets.  
 
Regarding the impact of international financial regulation, at least in the short term, the 
fragility of the financial system will most likely not be reduced substantially. The sovereign 
debt crises in Europe and the problems with the US deficit of course create additional 
tensions. Financial regulators in middle income countries should employ elements of 
international financial regulation (e.g. counter-cyclical regulation, possible increases in 
quantity and quality of capital if these are required, introducing, where necessary the liquidity 
coverage ratio), which goes to the heart of the vulnerability of banks (assuming excessive risk 
in boom times, dependence on funding liquidity). Leverage measures should be introduced, 
though probably with a smaller ratio than is currently envisioned by Basel 3. Furthermore 
they should support the international push for transparency in derivatives market. 
 
Given that the next large scale financial crisis seems possible, policymakers in middle income 
countries should get involved in emergency planning for bankruptcy of large scale 
conglomerates which operate in their nations in order to know what to do in case bankruptcy 
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occurs. They should encourage or require subsidiaries rather than branches as this gives them 
larger regulatory leverage over these banks. This is important, as otherwise countries which 
are not primarily affected by a financial crisis might experience a credit crunch if foreign 
banks quickly withdraw their money.  
 
Financial regulators need to use their judgment on the business models of their banks in order 
to identify weak spots such as over-reliance on external liquidity, due to their mismatches 
between assets and liabilities. Such mismatches should be limited by regulation. They could 
also be discouraged by requiring banks to account for the maturity mismatch risks via extra 
capital charges (see Warwick Commission Report, op cit). 
 
A measure which is not considered much in the financial regulation of the financial centers is 
the reintroduction of large reserve balances of the banks at the central banks. These would 
generate a buffer if banks run into a funding liquidity problems, thereby also reducing the 
likelihood of these problems occurring. At the same time, they could provide the central bank 
with a buffer it could use to intervene in funding markets during a liquidity dry up (s. d’Arista 
and Griffith Jones 2010: 145f). 
 
Equally important, for middle income countries, is to avoid or restrict currency mismatches 
between banks’ assets and liabilities; there is a long history of such currency mismatches 
leading to increased vulnerability of banks in middle income countries, both in Latin America 
and Asia, which has become an important factor in  banking crises. The seriousness of these 
problems was again shown in large currency mismatches in Eastern Europe (for example 
Hungary), leading to very problematic effects in 2007 and 2008. Many developing middle 
income countries have tended to regulate banks’ currency mismatches better than in the past, 
which has contributed to a strengthening of their banking systems. For example, in Uruguay 
regulators forbid granting loans to borrowers without income in these currencies or increasing 
the capital charges for banks for loans in foreign currencies (s. Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 
2009: 19). One of the risks that policy makers need to be aware of, however, is that in 
restricting currency mismatches on bank balance sheets often results in a transfer of risk to 
firm balance sheets (s. Stiglitz et al 2006; UN 2010). In addition, new challenges have 
emerged, with more widespread use of derivatives, which make it more difficult for regulators 
to measure the exact currency mismatches; the fact that derivatives are being encouraged on 
the exchanges should help transparency and help measure more accurately net currency 
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mismatches. It seems important for middle income countries also to further improve 
measurement of total currency mismatches, including the impact of derivatives, and where 
necessary, to tighten regulation. 
 
The strict regulation of the maturity mismatches of banks can also help. By encouraging and 
even forcing banks to have liabilities which approximately match the maturities of assets, 
external shocks will have less of an impact on the banking system. This can have the 
unwanted effect of reducing the long- term credit supply, or it can result in a transfer of risk 
from the bank’s balance sheet to firms’ balance sheets (s. Stiglitz et. al. 2006), but states can 
enact measures to counteract this. They can do so by encouraging long term savings or by 
increasing the role of public development banks, which can provide more long term finance.  
 
Another lesson that can be drawn from Central and Eastern Europe is that the conventional 
wisdom that dominance of foreign banks contributes to banking stability in crises can be 
wrong. Indeed, the opposite became true in certain cases during the global financial crisis. 
The dominance of foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe contributed to a credit crunch, 
when these banks tried to withdraw their funds from the periphery to the center (Raviv 2008: 
298). 
 
Policy suggestions summary 
Amongst the key regulatory measures that middle income regulators may wish to 
consider, drawing on the experience of the global financial crisis, and recent regulatory 
reforms, internationally, in the US and Europe are: 
- Regulators need to fight against self-feeding credit growth, especially  based on asset price 
appreciation  via counter-cyclical regulations (with  capital and provision charges, limits to 
credit growth, increase loan to collateral ratios) 
-Prevent large currency mismatches for households, companies and banks 
-Increase quantity and quality of core capital charges substantially (possibly up to a factor of 
two, where this is required, but taking account of specific circumstances in middle income 
countries, including relatively high capital adequacy ratios) and reduce the simple leverage of 
banks.  
-Require banks to account for the risks they take off-balance sheets, with appropriate levels of 
capital to back these risks; this requires close, hands-on supervision of the business models of 
banks and transactions of banks.  A simpler and more transparent solution is to require banks 
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to put all transactions on the balance sheet 
-Stricter bank regulation and supervision for banks which have large trading books and are 
involved in credit transfer mechanisms: they are more exposed to volatility 
-Require derivatives to go through exchanges, as much as possible, e.g. by using the lack of 
legal enforceability on speculative derivatives as a strong incentive to do so. 
-Restrict wholesale funding dependence of banks by forcing them to have back-up liquidity 
options (including reserves at the central bank), as well as liquidity requirements 
-Engage in emergency planning for the failure of large international banks operating in the 
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